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NOTES

WITNESSES -

COMPETENCY -

TESTIMONY

AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES OR HEIRS OF PERSONS

139
OF PARTIES FOR OR

DECEASED.-Among

the many rules of evidence which North Dakota shares with other
jurisdictions is the rule which prohibits testimony by either party,
in an action by or against the representatives or heirs of a deceased
person, concerning any transaction or conversation with the deceased.' A vestige of the common law doctrine that parties in
interest were not competent witnesses in any action, 2 this rule, now
popularly known as the "dead man's statute," occupies the unique
position of being severely criticized by nearly all of the eminent
writers on the subject.' In spite of this criticism, the states have
generally been reluctant to discard this common law relic.' The
proponents of the rule justify its continued existence with the
arguments that without this safeguard the temptation for fraud and
perjury would be too great, 5 the estates of the dead would be
unduly imperiled,' and the right and privilege of giving testimony
must be mutual.7 The critics of the rule contend that these premises
are based upon fallacy.8 They argue that such an arbitrary rule
operates as an intolerable injustice through the exclusion of just
claims, that it encourages the subornation of perjury, that it is
equally as important to save the estates of living men from loss by
lack of proof as it is to save the estates of dead men from false
"In any civil action or proceeding by or
1. N.D. Rev. Code §31-0103 (1943)
against executors, administrators, heirs at law, or next of kin in which judgment may be
rendered or ordered entered for or against them, neither party, except as provide4 in section 31-0104 and section 31-0105, shall be allowed to testify against the other as to any
transaction whatever with or statement by the testator or intestate, unless called to testify
thereto by the opposite party. Where a corporation is a party to any proceeding mentioned
in this section, no agent, stockholder, officer, or manager of such corporation, shall be
permitted to testify to any transaction or conversation had with the testator or intestate."
2. Morgan et al, The Law of Evidence 23 (1927); McCormick, Cases on Evidence
207 (2d ed. 1948).
3. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence §578 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan et al, op. cit. supra :iote
1, at 24; Taft, Comments on Will Contests in New York, 30 Yale L. J. 593, 605 (1921).
4. 2 Wigmore, Evidence §578 n.1 (3d ed. 1940) (only 6 states do not recognize
this disqualificatio ).
5. Owens v. Owens, 14 W.Va. 88, 95 (1878) "The temptation to falsehood and
concealment in such cases is considered too great to allow the surviving party to testify
in his own behalf."; 3 Jones, Evidence §773 (4th ed. 1938).
"It must be con6. Williams v. Clark, 42 N.D. 107, 172 N.W. 825, 827 (1919)
ceded that the rule is a salutary one and based upon sound public policy, when it is
considered the great evil that might result and the loss that might occur to the estates
of deceased persons . . ."; Bank of Bottineau v. Warner, 17 N.D. 76, 114 N.W. 1085

(1908).
"This right and privilege must be
7. Louis v. Easton, 50 Ala. 470, 471 (1873)
mutual . . . . If death has closed the lips of the one party, the policy of the law is to
close the lips of the other."
8. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence §578 (3d ed. 1940) "As a matter of policy, this survival of a part of the now discarded interest-qualification is deplorable in every respect;
for it is based on a fallacious and exploded principle, it leads to as much or more false
decision than it prevents, and it encumbers the profession with a profuse mass of barren
quibbles over the interpretation of mere words."; Morgan et al, op. cit. Supra note 1, at
24; See Omlie v. O'Toole, 16 N.D. 126, 112 N.W. 677 (1907).
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claims, and that safeguards for truth such as cross-examination offer
sufficient protection against the frequent assertion of false claims. 9
The North Dakota statute is similar to those in effect in the
majority of states.10 A few jurisdictions" have greatly modified or
abolished the standard form of the statute. The problem posed is
whether the existence of the statute in its present form in North
Dakota is justified or whether the rule should be modified or
abolished as has been done in those jurisdictions.
Construction of the North Dakota Statute
North Dakota, as well as most other jurisdictions, has given the
statute a strict construction." This would seem to indicate that the
jurists recognize that there is a certain harshness embodied in the
rule which should not be extended by judicial legislation. Justice
Corliss, in St. John v. Lotland,'3 delivered an oft-quoted verbal
fusilade against the expediency of the statute, stating in part:
"Statutes which exclude testimony on this ground are of
doubtful expediency. There are more honest claims defeated
by them, by destroying the evidence to prove such claims,
than there would be fictitious claims established if all such
enactments were swept away, and all persons rendered competent witnesses. To assume that in that event many false
claims would be established by perjury is to place an extremely
low estimate on human ingenuity and adroitness. He who possesses no evidence to prove his case save that which such
statute declares incompetent is remediless. But those against
whom. a dishonest demand is made are not left utterly unprotected because death has sealed the lips of the only person who
can contradict the survivor, who supports his claim with his
oath. In the legal armory there is a weapon whose repeated
thrusts he will find is difficult, and in many cases impossible,
to parry if his testimony is a tissue of falsehoods-the sword
of cross-examination. For these reasons, which lie on the very
surface of this question of policy, we regard it as a sound rule
to be applied in the construction of statutes of the character of
the one whose interpretation is here involved, that they should
not be extended beyond their letter when the effect of such
extension will be to add to the list of those whom the act
renders incompetent as witnesses."
9. See note 2, supra.

10. For a compilation of the statutes see 2 Wigmore, Evidence §488 (3d ed. 1940).
11. 46 Harvard L.
legislative reform.

Rev. 834

(1933)

states

that only nine states

12. E.G., Grange v. Grange, 56 N.W.2d 688, 692 (N.D.
77 N.D. 346, 43 N.W.2d 649

(1950);

have attempted

1953); O'Connor v. Immele,

Carlson v. Bankers Trust Co., 242 Ia.

1207, 50

N.W.2d 1, 5 (1951); contra: Cocker v. Cocker, 215 Minn. 565, 10 N.W.2d 734 (1934)
(liberal construction).

13. 5 N.D. 140, 143, 64 N.W. 930 (1895).

NOTES

In order for the statute to be invoked, four elements must concur:
a civil action or proceeding by or against executors, administrators,
heirs at law, or next of kin; an action in which judgment may be
rendered for or against those parties; the witness disqualified must
be a party to the action or the agent of a corporation which is a
party; and that witness must be attempting to testify to a transaction
14
with the deceased.
The first of these elements appears to have presented a major
problem in North Dakota only in cases concerning the probate of
wills. In a case of this type it was held that such is not an action
against any person but is in the nature of an action in rem, and
thus outside the scope of the statute. 17' Justice Bronson dissented,
stating that the estate of the deceased was directly involved and
that the probate of a will is a special proceeding within the express
terms of the statute."e The majority opinion seems to be in accord
with the view adopted in most other jurisdictions.' 7
The requirements that the action must be one in which judgment may be rendered for or against executors, administrators,
heirs at law or next of kin, was construed in Miller v. First Nat.
Bank,8 an action brought by an administrator to recover the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of the deceased. The trial
court sustained an objection to testimony of an agent of the defendant. In reversing the decision, the majority of the court held
that an action on a life insurance policy is not a claim or demand
against an estate, or a claim through which the estate may benefit or
sustain a loss in any way. Thus a judgment cannot be ordered for or
against the executors, administrators, heirs at law or next of kin,
as such. Concurring in part, Justice Burr contended that the action
could be brought by the administrator only in his capacity as an
administrator, and that the mere fact that the avails of the policy
were not subject to the debts of the deceased but were to go
directly to the heirs was not sufficient to place the administrator
outside the terms of the disqualifying statute. 9
The third requisite to the invocation of the statute-that requir14. N.D. Rev. Code §31-0103 (1943); see Miller v. First Nat. Bank, 62 N.D. 122,
242 N.W. 124, 129 (1932) (concurring in part).
15. Keller v. Reichert, 49 N.D. 74, 189 N.W. 690 (1922).
16. See Keller v. Reichert, 49 N.D. 74, 87, 189 N.W. 690, 695 (1922) (dissent).
17. 22 Wash. L. Rev. 211, 216 (1947) " . . . the estate as an entity is not a party in
interest, since the effect of such proceeding is neither to increase or diminish the estate,
but only to settle the distribution of the estate . .
18. 62 N.D. 122, 242 N.W. 124 (1932).
19. See Miller v. First Nat. Bank, 62 N.D. 122, 134, 242 N.W. 124, 128 (1932)
(concurring in part).
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ing the disqualified witness to be a party to the action- has been
the subject of a large amount of litigation in North Dakota,2 0 but
apparently has presented no serious problems to the courts. A very
literal interpretation has been given to this section of the statute,
thereby keeping at a minimum the list of those rendered incompetent by the statute. 2' Under such a construction, agents of the
parties have been held to be outside the prohibition,2 2 and a mere
common interest with a party to the action does not render a
23
witness incompetent to testify.
The only departure from the strict or literal construction supplied
to the statute appears in the litigation concerning the term "transaction." The courts have liberally construed this term to embrace
every variety of affairs which conform to the subject of negotiation,
interviews, or actions between the parties, and to include every
method by which one person can derive impressions or information
from the conduct, condition or language or another..2 4 They have
construed negative testimony to be within the purview of the
statute..23 This departure from the strict interpretation, in view of
other portions of the statute, is difficult to explain. Whatever the
reason, the anomaly is apparently existent only in the interpretation of the term "transaction," for the courts have been careful to
insure that the transaction is one which has been undertaken

20. E.g.,

Hampden

Implement

Co.

v.

Dougherty,

58 N.D.

817,

227

N.W.

(1929); Mowry v. Gold Stabeck Co., 48 N.D. 764, 186 N.W. 865 (1922);
v. Lofland, 5 N.D. 140 (1895).
21. O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N.D. 346, 351, 43 N.W. 2d 649 (1950)

555

St. John

"This

court

has followed the rule that statutes of this character should not be extended beyond their
letter when the effect of such extension will be to add to the list of those whom the act
renders incompetent as witnesses."; Hampden Implement Co. v. Dougherty, 58 N.D.
817, 227 N.W. 555 (1929) (son of deceased permitted to testify that his father told him
"to pay those grain checks on the car," since he was not party to action); St. John V.

Lofland, 5 N.D. 140 (1895)

(in an action brought by succeeding administrator, defend-

ant permitted to testify that he paid deceased administratrix).

22. Bank of Bottineau v. Warner, 17 N.D. 76, 81, 114 N.W. 1085 (1908)

(cashier

of plaintiff bank permitted to testify) "The prohibition . . . covers the evidence of
parties to actions or proceedings, and does not include the agents of parties." The statute
was amended in 1907 to expressly prohibit testimony by an agent of a corporation, but the
rule here would still apply to agents in general.

23. O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N.D. 346, 351, 43 N.W.2d 649 (1950)

"It is true,

that as relatives of the plaintiff, they may have had a common interest with her in

the

objective sought but such interest does not raise the bar of the statute."; Cf. Fox v. Fox,
56 N.D. 899, 902, 219 N.W. 784 (1928).
24. Gange v. Gange, 56 N.W.2d 688, 692 (N.D. 1953); Frink v. Taylor, 59 N.D.
47, 51, 228 N.W. 459 (1930); cf. Haut v. Gunderson, 54 N.D. 826, 829, 211 N.W. 982
(1926)
(term defined, for purpose of counterclaim in tort action, as embracing "an
entire occurence out of which a legal right springs or upon which a legal obligation is

predicated.").
25. Hughes v. Wachter, 61 N.D. 513, 238 N.W. 776 (1931)
to testify that decedent had never paid for certain stock).

(plaintiff not permitted
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directly with the decedent before invoking the statute. "
Statutory Exceptions
In addition to the testimony rendered admissible through a strict
construction of the statute, the legislature has expressly placed two
categories of testimony outside the scope of the statute. The first
of these exceptions includes testimony by a surviving spouse relating to any conversations or transactions with the deceased spouse
touching any business or property of either. 27 The second renders
testimony pertaining to a transaction with the decedent admissible,
if testimony relating to such transaction by the deceased has been
taken prior to his death and such testimony is introduced in behalf
28
of his executors, administrators, heirs at law, or next of kin.
The first exception has presented no serious problem to the
courts, but the second required considered construction in International Shoe Co. v. Hawkinson.29 In that case the trial court had
excluded testimony by the court reporter as to certain admissions
made by the deceased in a former trial, holding that such testimony
was prohibited by inference by the statute unless offered by the
personal representative. In holding such testimony to be competent,
the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the statutory provision
related solely to testimony taken in the proceeding or acion in which
it is sought to be introduced. Thus the testimony taken at a former
trial was held admissible through a strict interpretation of the ambiguity in the statute.
Waiver of the Statute
The prohibition of the statute is waived when either party is
"called to testify thereto by the opposite party." 0 A question arises
26. International Shoe Co. v. Hawkinson, 72 N.D. 622, 626, 10 N.W. 2d 590
(1943)
(reversed trial court's ruling excluding testimony concerning transaction with a
partnership in a suit against the representative of an alleged deceased partner)
"The
admission oa"plaintiff's testimony upon these matters would not result in any inequality
in regard to the opportunity to give testimony."; Bank of Bottineau v. Warner, 17 N.D.
76, 80, 114 N.W. 1085 (1908) (evidence as to the time when a building was completed
not a transaction with decedent); St. John v. Lofland, 5 N.D. 140 (1895).
27. N.D. Rev. Code §31-0104 (1943)
"In any action or proceeding by or against
any surviving husband or wife touching any business or property of either, or in which
the survivor or his or her family is interested in any way, such surviving husband or
wife, if he or she shall so desire, shall be permitted to testify under the general rules of
evidence as to any or all transactions and conversations touching such business or property
had with the deceased husband or wife."; See also Truman v. Dakota Trust, 29 N.D.
456, 151 N.W. 219 (1915); Perry v. Erdelt, 59 N.D. 741, 231 N.W. 888 (1930);
Frink v. Taylor, 59 N.D. 47, 228 N.W. 459 (1930).
28. N.D. Rev. Code §31-0105 (1943)
"If the testimony of a party to any civil
action or proceeding has been taken and afterwards he shall die and after his death the
testimony so taken shall be' used upon any trial or hearing in behalf of his executors,
administrators, heirs at law, or next of kin, the other party to the action shall be a
competent witness as to any and all matters to which the testimony so taken relates."
29. 72 N.D. 622, 10 N.W. 2d 590 (1943).
30. N.D. Rev. Code §31-0103 (1943).
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as to how far the competency of the witness extends when so called.
Again the courts have supplied a construction such as will strictly
confine the limits of the prohibition by holding that he becomes
a competent witness to any portion of the transaction pertinent to
the issues, and not merely to that portion about which he was interrogated.3t However, the court has not been willing to go to extremes that would clearly defeat the purpose of the statute. Thus
they have consistently refused to hold that the calling of an opposite
party constitutes a waiver when such -opposite party is clearly
antagonistic to the estate of the deceased. :
Effect of the Statute on Litigation
A search of the North Dakota Reports discloses that the rule
has been a subject of litigation in at least thirty-five instances. In
view of the relatively short existence of North Dakota as a state
this seems to be an unduly large amount of litigation, 33 and could
be an indication that something needs to be done with the statute
by way of revision or abolishment. The majority of these cases do
not reveal on their face that any great injustice has been meted out
because of the rule, but many of them do indicate that a different
result could have been obtained had the rule not been invoked.
In Larson v. Newman," an action for specific performance of a
land contract, the plaintiff was denied the opportunity to testify
concerning a conversation he had with the decedent which, if admitted, could have proved a ratification. In Adams v. Hagerott,5
a suit in equity whereby the plaintiff sought to be adjudged the
31. Frink v. Taylor, 59 N.D. 47, 228 N.W. 459 (1930)
"To permit the party for
whose benefit the statute is enacted to call a witness and interrogate him on some transaction pertinent to the issue and then limit him to that part of the transaction regarding
which he testified, would be giving an unfair advantage to the representative of -he
decedent.
It would be turning that which was intended as a shield for defense into a
sword for attack and would render the adversary helpless.
If a party to the action
desires to have the protection afforded to him, he must not call the opposite party to
testify regarding any part of that transaction or statement, unless he be willing said party
have an opportunity to explain every portion of that transaction which is pertinent 'o
the issue in the case."
32. Druey v. Baldwin, 41 N.D. 473, 172 N.W. 663 (1919)
(where plaintiff called
defendant executor, her husband, for cross-examination, his testimony was inadmissible
since his interests were antagonistic to the interests of the estate); Bank of Bottineau v.
Warner, 17 N.D. 76, 114 N.W. 1085 (1908)
(testimony by a contractor, a defendant,
was inadmissible even though called by plaintiff, since such testimony contradicted that
of executor, also a defendant, and was antagonistic to estate); Cardiff v. Marquis, 17 N.D.
110, 114 N.W. 1088 (1908); But cf. Fox v. Fox, 56 N.D. 899, 219 N.W. 784 (1928)
(plaintiff permitted to call his brothers, defendants, to testify to transaction whereby
their father obtained the land, even though they had prayed for same relief as asked by
plaintiff).
33. See Model Code of Evidence, Rule 101 (1942) for the report of the Commonwealth Fund Committee which illustrates the large amount of litigation concerning the
ordinary type of dead man statute.
34. 19 N.D. 153, 121 N.W. 202 (1909).
35. 34 F.2d 899 (8th Cir. 1929).
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owner as trustee of certain stock certificates found in the possession
of the deceased, the court in commenting upon the intention of the
deceased, stated in part:
"From the statement of facts it is possible to draw different
conclusions as to the ultimate fact of intention on the part of
Mr. Gaines. Several obscure points would doubtless be cleared
up could we have the testimony of the two parties directly involved in the transaction ....
But the lips of Mr. Gaines were
sealed by death, and the lips of Mr. Adams are sealed by the
statutes of North Dakota."3
From other evidence the court found for the plaintiff. The result
could possibly have been different but for the statute. Another
example of possible injustice occurred in Regan v. Jones,3 7 an action
brought by the executors of the decedent on a note executed by
defendant to the deceased. A judgment for the plaintiff resulted
after the defendant had been precluded from testifying in relation
to a verbal transaction with the decedent. He defended the action
on the ground that the note was executed in payment of a stallion
purchased from the decedent, and that there had been a breach of
warranty under the terms of the agreement. This apparently was
his only means of proving his defense since others who were present
at the making of the verbal agreement could not establish that the
notes were given for the stallion. In jester v. Jester,8 an action to
determine adverse claims to land between the heirs of the deceased,
testimony by the defendant (who was also the administrator but
was sued in his individual capacity) to the effect that he had sent
money to his brother ( the deceased) through a bank to make payments on the land and to finance a quiet title action was held to be
barred by the statute. His claim to title in the land was defeated,
and he was relegated to the position of an heir in the assertion of
his rights. In a more recent decision, Larson v. Quanrud, Brink &
Reibold,' 9 the administrator brought suit for the conversion of
certain shares of stock allegedly pledged with the defendants by
the deceased. North Dakota's Supreme Court, in affirming a judgement for the plaintiff, stated:
"Q B & R contends that the stock, after being pledged, was
later transferred to Q B & R. Testimony as to the details, if
any there were, that would throw light on the transaction is
incompetent in this action ....
Because of the intervention of
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 903.
14 N.D. 591, 105 N.W. 613 (1905).
76 N.D. 517, 37 N.W.2d 879 (1949).
78 N.D. 70, 47 N.W.2d 743 (1951).
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(the) statute the trial court was and this court is reduced to
reliance upon circumstances and evidence of the conduct of the
parties and records of the corporation in determining whether
40
Q B & R obtained title to the stock by an outright transfer.."
These decisions, while not conclusively showing that any great
miscarriage of justice has resulted from the statute, do indicate
that a problem exists which merits consideration by the members
of the bar and by the legislators of North Dakota.
Solutions in Other Jurisdictions
A few jurisdictions have adopted "modifications" of the rule with
varying degrees of success. These "modifications" have been of
three types: (1) admitting testimony of the survivor when it appears to the court that injustice would result without such testimony; 4' (2) permitting testimony by the survivor, but allowing no
judgment or verdict to be rendered thereon unless such testimony
is corroborated;42 and (3) admitting testimony of the survivor as
43
well as declarations of the deceased.
The first of these "modifications" removes the arbitrary feature
of the rule and imparts flexibility to it, but is subject to the criticism
that it lacks certainty since the admissibility of testimony rests
within the discretion of the trial judge. 44 It has been suggested that
4
this type of statute is "the most workable of these modifications," 1
but litigation in jurisdictions adopting such a "modification" has not
borne out this suggestion. In New Hampshire a showing that the
survivor's claim will fail without his testimony is not sufficient to
make out a case of injustice.4 c Early Montana decisions construing
40. Id. at 76, 47 N.W.2d at 746.
41. See Ariz. Code Ann. §23-105 (1939)"...
unless called to testify thereto by
the opposite party or required to testify thereto by the court . . ."; Mont. Rev. Code
§93-701-3 (1947)
"... or when it appears to the court that, without the testimony of
the witness, injustice will be done."; N.H. Rev. Laws c. 392 §§25, 26 (1942) "If the
court finds that injustice may be done without the testimony of the party, the court may,
in its discretion, allow such party to testify."
42. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §20-205 (1941)"...
unless such evidence is corroborated by some material evidence."; Ore. Rev. Stat. §44.020 (1953)
Makes all parties
competent witnesses, §116.555 provides: "No other claim which has been rejected by the
executor or administrator shall he allowed except upon some competent evidence other
than the testimony of the claimant."; Va. Code §8-286 (1950)
"...
no judgement or
decree shall be rendered in favor of an adverse or interested party founded on his uncorrohorated testimony . . ."
43. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §7895 (1949)
"In actions by or against the representatives of deceased persons . . . the entries, memoranda and declarations of the deceased,
relevant to the matter in issue, may be received as evidence ... "; Mass. Gen. Laws c. 233,
§66 (1932); R.I. Gen. Laws c. 538 §4.
44. See Morgan et al, op. cit. supra note 1, at 29.
45. 22 Wash. L. Rev. 211, 220 (1947).
46. Morgan et al. op. cit. supra note 1, at 29 "The New Hampshire statute seems
not' to have worked for liberality. The Supreme Court has been called upon to interpret
it in some forty cases . . . It is significant that in none of these adjudications has the
survivor's testimony been held admissable."; See Cobb v. Follansbee, 79 N.H. 205, 107
AtI. 630 (1919).
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their statute permitted the exercise of discretion by the court only
when such testimony was necessary to make out a prima facie
case.17 However, a later decision has taken the view that such
testimony should not be admitted "until sufficient other independent
testimony has been admitted to warrant the court, in the exercise of
its discretion, to render a ruling in favor of the questionable testimony."4s1 This latter view has also been adopted in Arizona. 4 9 From
the results of these constructions it is apparent that this type of
"modification" will not solve all the problems existent under the
standard "dead man statute."
The second "modification"-that permitting testimony by the
survivor but allowing no judgement on his uncorroborated testimony-has been termed "misguided" by Wigmore.5 ° He admits
that it is a decided improvement over the rule of exclusion, but
argues that it favors the dead above the living, that it is based upon
the contingency that the claim will be dishonest with no means of
disclosing its dishonesty, and that any rule which interposes a technicality to prevent judicial action upon testimony which is in fact
completely believed and trusted, always contains an "abstract impropriety and injustice."'51 The Oregon decisions concerning this
type of statute clearly indicate that the survivor must make out a
prima facie case without his own testimony." - Thus this type of
"modification" is also of doubtful value.
The "modification" which admits the testimony of the survivor as
well as the hearsay declarations of the deceased has generally met
with the most favor.5 3 This type of statute has been recommended
by the Commonwealth Trust Fund of New York.54 A committee of
judges, practitioners and professors was appointed by the Fund to
determine through a practical test the workings of the Connecticut
statute. The committee sent questionaires to judges and members

47. Rowe v. Eggum,

107 Mont. 378, 87 P.2d 189 (1938);

Roy v. King's Estate, 55

Mont. 567, 179 Pac. 821 (1919); See Cox v. Williamson, 124 Mont. 512, 227 P.2d 614,
622 (1951)

(dissenting opinion).

48. Cox v. Williamson, 124 Mont. 215, 227 P.2d 614, 619 (1951).
49. See 46 Harv. L. Rev. 834, 836 (1933).
50. 7 Wigmore, Evidence §2065 (3 ed. 1940).
51. Ibid.

52. Seaton v. Security Savings & Trust Co., 131 Ore. 261, 282 Pac. 556, 559 (1929);
Coltra v. Penland, 45 Ore. 254, 77 Pac. 129, 133 (1904)
"...
material and pertinent testimony supporting or corroborating that
cient to go to the jury and upon which it might find a verdict.;
cit. supra note 1, at 30.

there must be other
given by him, suffiMorgan et at, op.

53. See Morgan et at, op. cit. supra note 1, at 34; Model Code of Evidence, Rule 101
(1942).
7
54. See 2

note 1, at 35.

Wigmore, Evidence

§5 8a

(3d

ed. 1940);

Morgan et at, op.

cit. supra
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of the bar in Connecticut. The two hundred and eighty-seven
answers received were classified according to the experience those
persons had had with the statute. The results showed that the opposition to the statute was in inverse ratio to their experience. Eightynine percent of the judges of higher courts (Supreme, Superior,
and Common Pleas) favored the statute; eighty-four and one-half
percent of the attorneys having experience with six or more cases
favored it; sixty percent of those having experience in one or more
cases favored it; but twenty of twenty-one lawyers without experience with the statute thought greater safeguards were needed. As
a result of this survey the following statute was recommended:
"No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any action,
suit or proceeding by reason of his interest in the event of the
same as a party or otherwise.
"In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the representatives of deceased persons, including proceedings for the probate of wills, any statement of the deceased, whether oral or
written, shall not be excluded as hearsay provided that the trial
judge shall first find as a fact that the statement was made by
decedent, and that it was made in good faith and on decedent's
personal knowledge." '
HAROLD 0. BULLIS.

55. See note 54, supra.

